Federal Reserve : The changing face of monetary policy by Betty Joyce Nash
T
wo presidential appointees
were recently sworn in as gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve
Board. As hearings in the U.S. Senate
proceeded toward confirmation, the
popular labels “hawk and dove” flew
freely as Fed watchers sought clues
for shifts in thought among the
appointees. The new governors, Janet
Yellen and Sarah Raskin, will serve on
the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC), the body charged with 
conducting monetary policy. 
Labels never fit well, though, and
today hawk and dove are even more
relative as monetary policy has
achieved a certain consensus about
some issues, particularly the relation-
ship between inflation and long-run
unemployment. Macroeconomics and
monetary policy today are better
understood than in the 1960s, ’70s,
and ’80s. Core principles include a pri-
ority for stable prices, an inflation
target (either explicit or implicit), and
the conditioning of expectations in a
way that doesn’t surprise markets.
Then and Now
The FOMC comprises 19 members, 12
of whom are voting members. The
seven Board governors (when fully
staffed) and the New York Fed presi-
dent always vote, along with a rotating
group of four Reserve Bank presi-
dents. After its deliberations, the
FOMC issues a statement directing
the New York Fed to make the trades
that influence the availability of credit
in the economy. The Banking Act of
1935 created the committee and, for
many years, participants and voting
members alike were bankers and
lawyers, not economists.
That’s no surprise. Back when the
Federal Reserve System was formed in
1914, the job of the regional Reserve
Banks was to issue currency and, later,
to sort checks. The Reserve Banks also
were lenders of last resort, issuing
loans to banks through the discount
window. Those staffing the Reserve
Banks back then were typically
former commercial bankers.
In those first two decades, mone-
tary policy wasn’t considered part of
the Reserve Banks’ mission, says Jerry
Jordan, former Cleveland Fed presi-
dent. He also served on the Council of
Economic Advisers under President
Ronald Reagan and as former research
director of the St. Louis Fed. When
the FOMC was formed, Board chair-
man and banker Marriner Eccles
wanted to minimize the role of the
Reserve Bank presidents.  
The first three of the eight FOMC
chairmen were in business or banking.
One of the longest serving and most
influential was William McChesney
Martin. He chaired the FOMC from
1951 through 1970. The FOMC of the
1950s generally responded to increases
in expected inflation by raising the
federal funds rate in a manner consis-
tent with that of the inflation-taming
1980s and 1990s, according to econo-
mists who have studied that era. 
By the 1960s, Board staff and 
governors included more economists,
but few Reserve Bank presidents were
economists. That could be a handicap
at meetings, Jordan says. “So, if you
had a staff in Washington conversant
with economic models and some (aca-
demic) governors, then that put the
Reserve Bank presidents at a disad-
vantage.” The communication gap
could be dramatic under some chair-
men. For example, Arthur Burns was
the first academic economist to chair
the Board. Aprofessor of economics at
Columbia University, he served under
Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy
Carter during most of the 1970s. 
“Arthur’s style was to pick on some-
body at every meeting,” Jordan
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ated with whoever was being picked on.” 
Over time, Reserve Banks built individual research
departments, and research directors often attended FOMC
meetings with Bank presidents. There, they often engaged
in policy discussions. Richmond had one of the earliest
departments in the system, recalls economist Dewey Daane,
now an emeritus professor at Vanderbilt University. Daane
joined the Bank’s research department in 1939, directed
from 1937 until 1949 by University of Virginia economist
Elbert Kincaid. Here’s how Daane recalls his introduction
to the FOMC: “The [Richmond Fed] president called me
into the office and said, ‘I think the presidents are going 
to get mixed up more in the monetary side. I don’t know
anything about that. You’ll have to help me.’” Daane later
served two terms on the Board of Governors, from 1963
through 1974.
By the 1970s, more economists began moving into
Reserve Bank presidencies. Some Reserve Banks have had
relatively few presidents since 1914; tenure averages nearly
11 years. The Richmond Fed has had only seven presidents.
“What that means is that the Reserve Bank presidents are
the institutional memory of the Federal Reserve,” says
William Poole, who was president of the St. Louis Fed from
1998 until March 2008.
The Federal Reserve Act calls for diverse representation
from not only financial, but also agricultural, industrial, and
commercial, interests. In fact, William McChesney Martin
objected, in 1966, to the appointment of economist Andrew
Brimmer. Nothing personal, he said, he simply didn’t want
another economist, citing the Act, according to Allen
Meltzer’s A History of the Federal Reserve. Early Board 
governors were, like Reserve Bank presidents, likely to be
bankers, businessmen, or lawyers. 
Governors today may be economists, among them well-
known academics like Ben Bernanke, but they also may be
nominated for their specialty knowledge in business or law.
In addition to FOMC duties, they also head committees
that govern the Board. Of the current six Board members,
two hold doctorates in economics. 
Go-Stop
By the 1970s, more economists were serving on the FOMC,
but they could not steer the nation out of growing inflation.
The 1970s have been deemed a time of “disarray” in mone-
tary policy by Marvin Goodfriend, a former long-time
Richmond Fed economist now at Carnegie Mellon
University. In a Journal of Economic Perspectives paper, 
“How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy,”
Goodfriend outlines the debates. 
Policymakers debated the inflation process. The division
broke down between those who thought unions, monopoly
firms, or outside shocks such as oil and food prices caused
inflation, and the monetarists, who blamed the increase in
the money supply. A belief was widely held that expansive
monetary policy, a lower federal funds rate to stimulate the
Dennis Lockhart  2007-present  Finance
Jack Guynn  1996-2006  Public Servant
Robert P. Forrestal  1983-1995  Lawyer
William F. Ford  1980-1983  Economist
M. Monroe Kimbrel  1968-1980  Banker
Harold T. Patterson  1965-1968  Lawyer
Malcolm Bryan  1951-1965  Economist
W. S. McLarin Jr. 1941-1951  Banker
Robert S. Parker  1939-1941  Lawyer
Oscar Newton  1935-1939  Banker
Eugene R. Black 8/34-12/34 Banker
William S. Johns*    5/33-8/34 Banker
Eugene R. Black 1928-1933 Banker
M. B. Wellborn  1919-1928  Banker
Joseph A. McCord  1914-1919  Banker
Federal Reserve Bank ofAtlanta
Federal Reserve Bank ofBoston
Eric Rosengren  2007-present  Economist
Cathy E. Minehan  1994-2007 Banker
Richard F. Syron  1989-1994  Economist
Frank E. Morris  1968-1988  Economist
George H. Ellis  1961-1968 Economist
Joseph A. Erickson  1948-1961  Banker
Laurence F. Whittemore  1946-1948  Business
Ralph E. Flanders  1944-1946  Business
William W. Paddock  1942-1944  Lawyer
Roy A. Young  1930-1942  Banker
Wm. P.G. Harding 1923-1930  Banker
Charles A. Morss  1917-1922  Business
Alfred L. Aiken  1914-1917  Banker
Federal Reserve Bank ofChicago
Charles L. Evans  2007-present  Economist
Michael H. Moskow  1994-2007  Economist
Silas Keehn  1981-1994  Business
Robert P. Mayo 1970-1981  Banker
Charles J. Scanlon  1962-1970  Banker
Carl E. Allen  1956-1961  Banker
Clifford S. Young  1941-1956  Banker
George J. Schaller  1934-1941  Banker
James B. McDougal  1914-1934  Banker
Federal Reserve Bank ofCleveland
Sandra Pianalto  2003-present  Business
Jerry L. Jordan  1992-2003 Economist
W. Lee Hoskins  1987-1991 Economist
Karen N. Horn  1982-1987 Economist
Willis J. Winn  1971-1982  Finance
W. Braddock Hickman  1963-1970 Economist
Wilbur D. Fulton  1953-1963  Banker
Ray M. Gidney  1944-1953 Banker
Matthew J. Fleming  1935-1944  Banker
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 output, could permanently reduce unemployment. That
policy could be inflationary, and often was. But it could be
worthwhile, providing inflation didn’t get out of hand. 
Burns, for one, believed in “the power of many corpora-
tions and trade unions to exact rewards that exceed what
could be achieved under conditions of active competition.”
This power drove costs and prices “that may be cumulative
and self-reinforcing,” according to Burns’ testimony in
Congress quoted by Richmond Fed economist Robert
Hetzel in his book The Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve.
But, absent money supply increases, union or monopoly
power arguably couldn’t raise the general price level.
Though workers might negotiate higher wages, firms would
be hard-pressed to pass costs to consumers. 
Burns ran the committee forcibly and fell prey to poli-
tical pressure by some accounts. Former Richmond Fed
President Al Broaddus attended FOMC meetings under
three chairmen, including Burns. A chairman, he notes, can
exert tremendous influence, sometimes usefully and some-
times not. “If a chairman discourages discussion as Burns
sometimes did, in my view, you will lose the value of the
debate to help understand policy challenges you need to
face.” But the reverse is also true. If the chairman doesn’t
control the meeting flow, then excessive, free-form discus-
sion may hinder the committee’s work.
The Burns era is crucial to understanding today’s think-
ing about monetary policy. Though Burns took a public
stand against inflation, the federal funds rate fell from an
average of 8.02 percent in the first quarter of 1970 to 4.12
percent by the final quarter, theoretically to jump-start the
economy. The rate of inflation was 4.55 percent at the end of
that year, sending real interest rates below zero. 
Burns’ successor, G. William Miller, was inexperienced,
and served a scant 18 months until August 1979, when Paul
Volcker was sworn in. Monetary policy had failed to stop
inflation, and the Fed’s credibility eroded. The FOMC had
engaged in a “go-stop” policy that loosened money to reduce
unemployment by stimulating output. But when inflation
grew, worries loomed, and when the FOMC tightened
money by raising the federal funds rate, the policy could
throw the economy into recession. 
In this fashion, people began to expect inflation as
inevitable and factor it into buying decisions, fueling even
higher prices.
Richmond Fed’s first president with a doctorate in 
economics was Bob Black, who began his term in 1973. He’d
been president six years, a voting FOMC member every
third year, when he got Volcker’s call on Oct. 6, 1979, for a
special meeting. Volcker wanted to change the Fed’s proce-
dures. He wanted to set the quantity of reserves rather than
the price, the federal funds rate. Theoretically, the funds
rate would then settle appropriately — if the money supply
were targeted correctly. A fortuitous by-product was that
this relieved the Fed of rate-setting responsibility. In 1982,
inflation declined, and the Volcker Fed returned to targeting



















































  Federal Reserve Bank ofDallas
Richard W. Fisher  2005-present  Public Servant
Helen Holcomb* 2004-2005 Banker
Robert D. McTeer Jr.  1991-2004  Economist
Robert H. Boykin  1981-1991  Lawyer
Ernest T. Baughman  1975-1980  Economist
Philip E. Coldwell  1968-1974  Economist
Watrous H. Irons  1954-1968  Economist
R. R. Gilbert  1939-1953  Banker
B. A. McKinney  1931-1939  Banker
Lynn P. Talley  1925-1931  Banker
B. A. McKinney  1922-1925  Banker
R. L. Van Zandt  1915-1922  Banker
Oscar Wells  1914-1915 Banker
Federal Reserve Bank ofKansas City
Thomas M. Hoenig  1991-present  Economist
Roger Guffey  1976-1991  Lawyer
George H. Clay  1961-1976  Lawyer
H. G. Leedy  1941-1961 Lawyer
George H. Hamilton 1932-1941  Banker
W. J. Bailey  1922-1932  Banker
J. Z. Miller Jr. 1916-1922  Banker
Charles M. Sawyer  1914-1916  Banker
Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York
William C. Dudley  2009-present  Economist
Timothy F. Geithner  2003-2009  Public Servant
Jamie B. Stewart* 6/03-11/03 Banker
William J. McDonough  1993-2003  Economist
E. Gerald Corrigan 1985-1993  Economist
Anthony M. Solomon  1980-1984  Economist
Paul A. Volcker  1975-1979  Public Servant
Alfred Hayes 1956-1975  Banker
Allan Sproul  1941-1956  Lawyer
George L. Harrison  1928-1940  Lawyer
Benjamin Strong  1914-1928 Banker
*interim
Federal Reserve Bank ofMinneapolis
Narayana Kocherlakota  2009-present  Economist
Gary H. Stern  1985-2009  Economist
E. Gerald Corrigan 1980-1984  Economist
Mark H. Willes  1977-1980  Economist
Bruce K. MacLaury  1971-1976  Economist
Hugh D. Galusha Jr. 1965-1971  Lawyer
Frederick L. Deming  1957-1965  Economist
Oliver S. Powell  1952-1957  Banker
John N. Peyton  1936-1952  Banker
William B. Geery 1926-1936  Banker
Roy A. Young  1919-1926  Banker
Theodore Wold  1914-1919  Banker
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Region Focus | Third Quarter | 2010  9Jeffrey M. Lacker  2004-present  Economist
J. Alfred Broaddus Jr.  1993-2004  Economist
Robert P. Black  1973-1992  Economist
Aubrey N. Heflin  1968-1973  Lawyer
Edward A. Wayne  1961-1968  Banker
Hugh Leach  1936-1961  Banker
George J. Seay  1914-1936  Banker
Federal Reserve Bank ofPhiladelphia
Charles I. Plosser  2006-present  Economist
Anthony M. Santomero  2000-2006 Economist
Edward G. Boehne  1981-2000 Economist
David P. Eastburn 1970-1981  Economist
Karl R. Bopp  1958-1970  Economist
Alfred H. Williams  1941-1958  Economist
John S. Sinclair  1936-1941  Lawyer
George W. Norris  1920-1936  Lawyer
E. P. Passmore  1918-1920  Banker
Charles J. Rhoads  1914-1918  Banker
John F. Moore* 10/10-present Banker 
Janet L. Yellen  2004-2010  Economist
Robert T. Parry  1986-2004  Economist
John J. Balles  1972-1986  Economist
Eliot J. Swan 1961-1972  Economist
H. N. Mangels  1956-1961  Banker
C. E. Earhart  1946-1956  Banker
Ira Clerk  1/46-9/46 Banker
William A. Day  1936-1945 Banker
John U. Calkins  1919-1936 Banker
James K. Lynch  1917-1919  Banker
Archibald Kains  1914-1917  Banker
Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis
James Bullard 2008-present  Economist
William Poole  1998-2008  Economist
Thomas C. Melzer  1985-1998  Finance
Theodore H. Roberts 1983-1984  Banker
Lawrence K. Roos  1976-1983  Business
Darryl R. Francis  1966-1976  Economist
Harry A. Shuford  1962-1966  Lawyer
Delos C. Johns  1951-1962 Lawyer
Chester C. Davis  1941-1951  Business
Wm. McC. Martin Sr.  1929-1941  Banker
David C. Biggs 1919-1928 Banker
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fell from a high of 13.5 percent in 1980 to under 4 percent a
few years later, and maintained a low rate. Today, the Fed’s
implicit inflation target is about 2 percent. 
The Volcker disinflation, as the era is now called,
advanced the idea that stable prices are paramount; expec-
tations, whether of inflation or deflation, can influence
economic activity. 
Dissents were more frequent then, as policy was being
worked out. For instance, though Black agreed with
Volcker’s overall strategy, he dissented often over nuances of
policy. He once apologized to Volcker before voting by 
stating: “Mr. Chairman, it pains me to have to dissent
again.” He favored lower short-run money targets than the
committee as a whole thought appropriate. 
The Bernanke and Greenspan years seem downright
calm, dissent-wise, compared to the 1970s and early 1980s.
For example in 1978, members dissented 19 times in 10 of 
19 meetings. In 1979, there were 20 dissents in 13 meetings,
and in 1980, there were 25 dissents at 13 of 17 meetings 
during the year. 
A longer time span shows that about 8 percent of all 
voting observations from 1966 to 1996 were dissents,
according to economist Rob Roy McGregor of the
University of North Carolina at Charlotte. From 1987
through 1999, that proportion declined to 6 percent. He has
co-authored a book about FOMC decisionmaking, and says
the combination of professionals and advanced knowledge
may have contributed to less disagreement. “The decline in
dissent might have to do with the greater number of econo-
mists, but combined with that is the sense that we have a
reasonably unified framework that the committee can use.”
Today, McGregor says most economists believe as
Milton Friedman instructed: Inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon, not fundamentally driven by union or
monopoly-firm wages. “That issue has become settled in the
last 40 years and taken for granted by committee members.”
The idea that there may be a short-run trade-off but no
long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment,
McGregor confirms, is fairly well accepted.
Poole’s dissents were typically hawkish, but he also dis-
sented for other reasons. He dissented in January 2008, at a
conference-call meeting held one week prior to the sched-
uled meeting. He saw no reason for action one week ahead.
“I also believed the market would interpret the FOMC’s
action as a response to the decline in equity prices in
Europe,” he explains. The stock market at home was closed
because of a holiday. “And the Federal Reserve had always
argued that it did not respond to the stock market.” 
That notion of systematic, expected policy decisions is
paramount on the committee, and reflects academic work
on rational expectations in the 1970s, particularly that of
Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas. Before this idea had taken
root on the FOMC, members couldn’t fully appreciate the
need to make decisions that would not shock the market.
Poole cites, by way of example, that three strong employ-
ment reports in succession would have the market
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Federal Reserve Bank ofRichmond
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
 anticipating a rise in interest rates. “If the Fed raised the 
federal funds rate to exactly the same rate as the market
anticipated, then it wouldn’t be a surprise, and it would be
already priced into the market,” he explains. Before that idea
was understood, some policymakers thought policy actions
could be more effective if they jolted the market.
The rational expectations revolution in economics
emphasized the importance of monetary policy following a
path that is as predictable as possible, Poole says. “The mar-
ket should behave as policymakers expect and policymakers
behave as markets expect.”
The 13th Member: The Committee
Contributing to agreement is the committee itself, where
consensus is valued. Most members would say that the chair-
man never loses. A chairman has never been outvoted nor
will he ever be, Poole observes. 
Yet there’s always a measure of dissent and disagreement.
That produces healthy debate among the large number of
well-trained economists, many of them from the Reserve
Banks, and of course Bernanke himself is a thoroughly
trained economist, Broaddus says. Take the idea of inflation
targeting, for which Broaddus, Bernanke, and others have
argued. “Others opposed it. If you have deflation developing
but the Fed is aiming for between 1 percent and 2 percent, if
that target is there, people will think the Fed will do what
they have to do. Others don’t find that argument persuasive.
That’s an important debate. And it’s no less intense than the
old Keynesian-Monetarist debate.” 
Today, new disputes have sprung up, including ones over
the fine points of that earlier divide. The trade-off between
short-term unemployment and inflation can provoke differ-
ences, Poole notes, as well as the nature of the process by
which inflation expectations are created or changed.
Monetarism, Broaddus says, has morphed into the view
that what really matters is for the Fed to clearly state its
inflation objective. “That’s what you might call ‘Son of
Monetarism.’” 
More than two dissents are rare on the committee. “A
third, however, would be viewed as a sign that the FOMC is
in open revolt with the Chairman’s leadership,” former Fed
governor Laurence Meyer wrote in his book, A Term at the
Fed. That would disrupt the process of monetary policy-
making and unsettle financial markets.
Disagreement can stem from many quarters, for
instance, the ballooning of the Fed’s balance sheet. Jeffrey
Lacker, current Richmond Fed president, dissented at the
Jan. 27-28, 2009, FOMC meeting. It wasn’t because he dis-
agreed with expanding the monetary base, but because he
preferred to buy U.S. Treasury securities rather than target
credit programs through the Term Auction Lending Facility. 
Some economists think that “providing financial assis-
tance to particular entities is more like fiscal policy than
monetary policy,” Poole notes. He adds that today there 
are probably new significant disputes, and cites the “too big 
to fail” concept, the Fed’s credit policies, and debate over
whether the Bear Stearns bailout was a good idea as examples. 
Recorded dissents don’t necessarily reveal members’
preferences. Disagreement may not result in dissent, and
those can be probed only through the verbatim transcripts
of meetings. But the Reserve Bank presidents frequently
give speeches, in which they may detail ideas about mone-
tary policy, whether or not they’ve dissented. In this fashion,
they plant ideas in the public discourse. These discussions
also appear to be a way of informing the market, by condi-
tioning expectations. The federal funds target today is 
0 percent to 0.25 percent, for example, and Kansas City Fed
President Thomas Hoenig has dissented at each meeting
this year, signaling his inflation concerns. In contrast,
President James Bullard from the St. Louis Fed has not 
dissented, yet has spoken out regarding his concerns about
deflation, another signal to markets. FOMC statements
today employ the phrase “extended period” to tell the mar-
ket the rate will stay low until there’s a compelling reason to
move it.
And so while economists may have reached broad 
agreements on certain macroeconomic principles, voting
members are likely to disagree as discussions proceed, 
in search of the best policy path. But members do seem 
to agree on this: Predictability is paramount, with 
the market’s expectations aligned with those of 
policymakers.          RF
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